Triangle of Conflict: New „Eastern Questions“

By Riad al Khouri MLitt (Oxon)
Senior Economist and Principal
DEA Inc, Washington DC and Amman

Abstract: the Eastern Question of the late 1800s/early 1900s concerning the fate of the declining Ottoman Empire’s Balkan lands helped trigger fighting leading into WWI, while the Second World War was sparked by problems of how far eastward Germany’s border extended. Both issues are long settled, but others like them continue in new forms, with associated current battlefields lying east and south of mid- and late 20^th century places of conflict. Today, in reminders of the past decades’ unfinished geostrategic business, increasingly violent struggles on Europe’s periphery have important implications, especially for Turkey, which confronts more threats, as well as opportunities.

1. 1.    Background

Though 2014 marked the 100^th anniversary of the First World War’s outbreak and this year sees the passing of 70 years since WWII ended, some of the unresolved issues of those conflicts have re-erupted dramatically in the past few months. The 19^th century Eastern Question, which triggered WWI (concerning the fate of Balkan Ottoman territory as the Turks retreated), is now largely settled (barring less significant details like Greek-Macedonian friction) as are German-Polish border disputes that ignited the Second World War. Yet, related violent conflict still swirls on the east and south of Europe’s periphery.

The present friction echoes great 20^th century’s geostrategic clashes. Among those was the world’s largest tank battle, fought at Kursk in 1943 between European Axis forces and the dominant power to the east, the Soviet Union; the second-largest came in Sinai thirty years later, pitting Western-allied Israel against Egypt, at the time a friend of the USSR. Those two battles directly or otherwise pitted Russian against Western forces; today, in something of a Cold War rerun, the West and its minions once again confront the Russians and others from the east (including Iran). Taking an imaginary line connecting the above two 20^th century battles as the base of an isosceles triangle with its apex on the Caspian shore (as shown in the map below), areas included are the theater of what is now in effect a continental war that pits forces from the West against eastern powers.

Triangle of conflict: the 21^st century’s new battlefield

However, though friction in this geostrategic triangle is clearly rising, today’s conflict involves unclear battle-lines and murky alliances. The northern part of the area currently sees Russian involvement in the Ukraine (with previous flare-ups around the Caucasus); to the south, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) clashes with various forces, including the pro-Russian Syrian government, while other parts of the region witness different conflicts. The latter includes the Israel-Arab problem, which again flared up this year around Gaza.

1. 2.    Turkey at the Center

In the middle of these conflict zones geographically lies Turkey, which at the heart of an ailing Ottoman Empire was a focus of clashes in the early 20^th century, but today appears as player, not mere victim of strife. For Ankara, the Black Sea is a frontier zone where Turkey faces Russia (the most powerful state in the area, and on which Turks depend for their energy[1]) and the currently unstable Ukraine. Also a key geopolitical factor for Turkey is its direct border with the South Caucasus, where conflicts simmer, and which is crucial for Turkish hard and soft security.[2] However, the greatest current source of volatility in Turkey’s neighborhood is to the south, in Syria and Iraq, especially as concerns the Kurds.

Yet, to what extent is Ankara a regional giant emerging on the world geostrategic stage as opposed to a hapless victim of larger forces, like some of its neighbors? Being a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkey could be seen as part of the Western camp, but the Turks are more than just another asset in the arsenal of the West.

1. 3.    Kurdistan in the volatile Middle East

The Kurds have become politically more assertive over the past two decades, aided by positive economic factors, including hydrocarbon wealth in the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan. In May of last year, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) started major oil exports via a new pipeline connected to the Turkish port of Ceyhan; and during June Israel took its first delivery of this crude by tanker.[3] Growing oil sales could increase the KRG’s economic independence and bolster the push to form a separate Kurdish state. The capacity of the pipeline from Iraqi Kurdistan has been upgraded, with plans to increase it to 250,000 barrels per day. However, the Kurds are selling crude in defiance of Iraq’s central government in Baghdad, which has repeatedly condemned independent Kurdish oil exports saying that only the Iraqi state marketer can sell the country’s oil. The KRG retorts that Iraq’s constitution allows it to market oil independently, but Baghdad continues to block many KRG oil sales, including recent attempts in Morocco and the United States.

However, Kurdish crude sales to Israel are another story, and the Kurds’ attraction for Israelis goes beyond oil as they openly call for recognition of an independent Kurdistan. Prime Minister Netanyahu said last July that he backed supporting the “Kurdish aspiration for independence,” describing the Kurds as “a fighting people“ that „deserves political independence.” Ankara by contrast opposes an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, but has strong – and lucrative – relations with the KRG.[4]

1. 4.    The soft underbelly of Russia

Though currently not impacting Turkey in the same way as developments in Kurdistan, Russia’s southwest flank is also unsettled, especially in Ukraine (while potential volatility in the South Caucasus remains). Stabilization and the success of Ukraine’s domestic reform partly depend on the West’s stemming corrupt Ukrainian state fund flows into Western banks. In this way and others, entrenched interests across Europe continue to undermine Kiev, despite propaganda about democratization; meanwhile, Western circles portray Russia as the enemy in the Ukraine neighborhood, as well as around the South Caucasus.

Connecting events in the Ukraine with the Middle East, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abdollahian, expressing concern over Iraq, said last June that the US is trying to create a chaotic atmosphere in the Arab country similar to what it did in Ukraine.“The events in Iraq are following a plan by the US to turn the country into a second Ukraine,“ adding that „what is going on in Iraq is a psychological and media war by ISIL to make the country insecure.“ In similar remarks earlier that month, the Iranian President’s Deputy Chief of Staff Aboutalebi compared present Iraq with Ukraine before Crimea separated, and urged Iraqis to learn from Ukraine’s recent political developments, noting that if the Iraqi people and leaders do not „show sufficient wisdom,“ Iraq will face „a similar fate to Ukraine“ [5] – i.e. partition and the emergence of autonomous zones.

This destabilizing „creative chaos“ has long been espoused in certain Western circles. Some in the West genuinely thought or still believe that they would be promoting democracy by attacking the governments of Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Libya etc; other Westerners’ actions pretended to this but were actually aiming for destabilization as an end in itself. Ultimately, „democratizing“ or naked meddling both create space for forces amenable to the West economically – as well as politically (i.e. opposing Russia and/or Iran).

1. 5.    Turkey’s Opportunities and Threats

The re-eruption of anti-Russian Cold War, as well as lingering Iran-US tension, feeds the metastasis of Middle Eastern conflict into many places from Kurdistan to the Syrian steppe and Sinai, as well as on Russia’s southwestern flank. Such tension and violence involve outside and regional powers including Turkey, which more than others is potentially impacted by this instability.

Historically, these conflicts are rooted in the pre-WWI question over how Europe should deal with geostrategic gaps first left by Ottoman retreat, followed by the fall of French/British rule in the Middle East after WWII, then by the Cold War’s end. Today’s instability comes in the wake of unraveling American hegemony. In such a situation, sustainable peace and development in the conflict zones around Turkey become more urgent to help secure stability on Europe’s borders. Involving among other things staunching the flow of illegal migration, and securing the sources of and transport routes for hydrocarbons, tourism, and other goods and services traded by Europe, peace and prosperity in the Middle East and on Russia’s southwest flank are Europe’s vital concerns – and Turkey’s in particular. Ankara has much to do to secure this stability, and a lot to gain from it.

Whatever the longer-term issues for Ankara on Russia’s southwest flank, in the short run, Turkey’s more pressing problem is the Middle East. In the late 20^th century, Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky said that „no one in Europe today seriously doubts that Middle Eastern conflict is currently a problem of central importance.“[6] Indeed for many inside and outside Europe, including Turkey, several decades later this thought is even more pertinent. Behind the rise of ISIL, American-Iranian friction, and numerous other current Middle East issues, the region’s central problem remains Arab conflict with Israel, a Western outpost. Normal relations with the Arab world will guarantee Israel’s existence. Unfortunately, the more peace deals signed between the Jewish state and her neighbors, and the greater its success in eking out de facto „normalization“ with them and others, including the Kurds, without justice for Palestine, Israel and the rest of the region become less secure. Here too, Ankara could play a major positive role – or see its interests suffer in scenarios of endless war.

1. 6.    Conclusion

Geopolitical shifts in the post-Soviet area and the Arab Spring’ wake will continue. Among the main beneficiaries of this could be Ankara as an emerging force whose influence in the post-Soviet space and the Middle East increased significantly in the past decade. Turkey has the potential: its population in 2050 will reach about 95 m, with a chance of joining the developed world in terms of income per capita. Militarily, Turkey is also the most powerful state in its neighborhood, boasting a standing army larger than that of any other bordering country.

However, whether Ankara will be able to use this potential depends on how it copes with serious present challenges, including the Kurdish issue.[7] If unfinished Kurdish state formation in the Turkish periphery[8] gets out of control, amid creative chaos as practiced in Libya, Syria etc, Turkey could go back to being the Sick Man of Europe of the 19^th century, instead of becoming more powerful and prosperous, as it has been doing for the last decade.

In some scenarios, it would be not only Kurdish state-creation that is in play, but the continuing evolution of Turkey towards prosperous stability. In that respect, one explanation for current diplomatic tension is the adoption by Ankara of a neo-Ottoman vision, which according to a traditional Kemalist Turkish nationalist interpretation is „unrealistic and prone to adventurism.“ [9] in any case, after Ankara’s policy of „zero problems with neighbors“ that emerged less than a decade ago, Turkey since 2011 finds itself amid messy conflict on its border. Defenders of current policy could argue that such projection of power is part of the military-diplomatic dimension of globalization, the ultimate goal of which is to secure influence beyond national borders for greater prosperity. Nevertheless, in becoming involved more deeply with thorny issues such as Kurdish autonomy, Ankara may be leaving itself open to trouble in eastern and southern Anatolia that, with creative chaos introduced by outside powers (including some circles in NATO countries) could eventually threaten Turkey’s own stability. Further problems on Russia’s southern flank could also eventually bother Turkey. Yet, the upside of these situations is the political and economic gains that Ankara could make, as a powerful and stable Turkey influences and does business with the various state and other forces in its periphery that need her help to develop.

***

[1] Isa Afacan „Russia-Turkey Relations: limited cooperation, ongoing rivalries“ Turkish Review August 2014

[2] Adam Balcer „An Audit of Power: Turkey’s Leverage in the Post-Soviet Space“ EDAM Black Sea Discussion Paper April 2012

[3] Reuters „Iraqi Kurdistan sells latest oil, cargo tanker empty near Israel“ August 21 2014

[4] „Israel, Turkey back off pro-Kurd independence stances“ The Daily Star 1 July 2014

[5] Fars News Agency „Deputy FM: US Trying to Turn Iraq into Another Ukraine“ 1 July 2014

[6] Berg M (ed) The Struggle for a Democratic Austria New York City 2000, p 445

[7] Henri Barkey Preventing Conflict over Kurdistan Washington DC 2009

[8] Winston Harris „Chaos in Iraq: Are the Kurds Truly Set to Win?“ Journal of Small Wars August 2014 http://smallwarsjournal.com

[9] Omer Taspinar Turkey’s Middle East Policies: between neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism Carnegie Papers No 10 Beirut 2008

Anfang November 2014 fand in Wien die Kooperationskonferenz „Enhancing women’s share in peace and security“ statt, an der auch das Bruno Kreisky Forum für internationalen Dialog beteiligt war. An dem zweitägigen Symposium haben ExpertInnen aus Politik, Regierung, Militär, Wissenschaft, Medien und Zivilgesellschaft teilgenommen und über die Hauptziele sowie die wichtigsten Herausforderungen und Prioritäten zur Beteiligung von Frauen im Prozess von Sicherheit und Frieden im 21. Jahrhundert zu diskutieren. Soeben ist das aktuelle Policy Paper dazu erschienen!

Die Zweistaatenlösung ist das einzige Modell, das die Politik als Lösung für den Nahostkonflikt diskutiert. Aber einige Intellektuelle aus Israel und Palästina denken längst über einen binationalen Staat nach.

Ein Beitrag unserer Kuratorin Gudrun Harrer im Online-Standard

Am 10. Februar lud BKF-Präsident Rudolf Scholten Irmgard Griss, ehemalige Präsidentin des Obersten Gerichthofes, zu einem Kamingespräch in die Armbrustergasse ein.

Auch Josef Votzi vom Kurier war dabei und hat einen Bericht darüber verfasst.

Elias Khoury’s speech on the occassion of the Public Roundtable Debate “RETHINKING THE POLITICS OF ISRAEL/PALESTINE”, organized by the Bruno Kreisky Forum for International Dialogue and the S&Group in the European Parliament in Brussels, February 5th 2015 

„The big question that is still puzzling me is why the myths in the question of Palestine were and are still able to veil the realities of the present.

I am not referring here to the original myth which was the midwife of the original sin of Israel during the war of the Nakba in 1948 that led to the ethnic cleansing of Palestine.

I will be referring to three myths that are still playing a major role in misleading the public opinion, and creating a feeling that peace and justice can never be two complementary elements in formulating the present and the near future of the Arab Mashreq known as the Middle East.

One of the major obstacles facing the discussion of the question of Palestine is that we have always to prove evident facts such as: the Palestinian people exists and was pushed by force from its land, and that Palestine was never a waste land or a desert and that Palestine is now the last country in the world that is still under a colonial military and racist occupation, where the Palestinians are becoming the Jews of the Jews.

What I am calling here evident facts becomes, with the three myths that I will be trying to discuss today, a real problem, because without the demystification of these three myths we will remain in a political and moral labyrinth, where the only outcome would be a dead end.

The Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish wrote in one of his poems about “the invader’s fear of memories and songs”, this fear is not a poetic metaphor, but is part of the daily realities of the Palestinian villages in Israel destroyed and then covered with forests. The relationship between these new forests and the buried memory will lead in the story of the Israeli writer A.B.Yehoshua entitled “Facing the Forests” to a huge fire eating the trees and uncovering the remains of a past that is still the present of the land of Palestine.

I will not be speaking about memories and the nostalgia for a lost homeland, but rather about recent history, about this past that is still the present, and about facts that are covered by the thick narrative of the victor that was able to make from the myths an integral part of the dominant discourse.

I will be speaking this morning about three myths: 1-the myth of partition, 2-the myth of the refugee problem as an outcome of the Arab Israeli war in 1948, and 3-the myth of the peace process and the two states solution in the frame of the Oslo agreements. The deconstruction of these myths will be the first step towards imagining a possible future.

1-The myth of partition

The big question raised in the face of the Palestinian struggle is why the Palestinians did not accept the UN partition plan of 1947, and when the reply is that the P.L.O. in the Palestinian congress of Algiers built its claim for statehood on the UN resolution 181, which was the legal document of partition, the reply will be but it is too late now.

It is absurd to argue the idea of being late with an ideology whose legitimacy is based upon the so called heavenly promise, and with a national discourse based upon the idea of waiting 2000 years before the “return” of the Jews to their “promised land”!

This kind of debate will lead nowhere, and instead I want to question the idea of partition itself: Was there a real project of partition? or partition was a project to cover ethnic cleansing and the annexation of what will be left of Palestine to Transjordan?

The first project of partition was suggested by the British Royal Commission led by Lord Peel which was sent to Palestine in April 1936, during the Palestinian revolt against the British colonialism and the Jewish immigration. There are 3 major points in this plan:

1-   The number of the Arab population in the suggested Jewish state was nearly equal to the number of its Jewish population: 304,900 Jews and 294,700 Palestinians, whereas the number of the population in the suggested Arab State was 485,200 Arabs and 7200 Jews. In order to solve this problem that makes of the Jewish state a bi-national state, the report suggested a “compulsory transfer” of the Arabs from the Jewish State.

2-   The commission recommended the annexation of the Arab State to Transjordan.

3-   The report mentioned that Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Ramallah and tens of Palestinian villages will stay under British mandate.

This plan will become the master plan of the other projects of partition, this will be the case with the British government project of partition of 1944, that made some changes on the Peel project, but one of the major common elements between these two projects was the fact that the so called Arab state will be annexed to Transjordan.

In these two projects of partition there was no Palestinian state. Although the UN resolution of the partition November 29 1947, mentioned two states, but it was clear that there were no two states in the horizon, and that the destiny of Palestine was already decided with the Peel report: a Jewish state and the annexation of what will be left to Jordan. This feeling turned out to be a reality after the publication of the historical facts by the New Israeli Historians about a deal between the Zionist leadership and prince Abdullah of Jordan.

2-The refugee problem and the Arab Israeli war

The refugee problem was not an outcome of the war launched by the Arab states against the new born Jewish state inMay 15 1948, but it was an outcome of an Israeli military master plan of occupation and ethnic cleansing under the name of the Dalet plan.

In his study “The Dalet Plan”, first published in the Middle East Forum 1961, the Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi proved that this plan which its implementation began in April 1948, two months and a half before the end of the British mandate and the entrance of the Arab armies, was composed of 13 military operations, 8 of them were outside the boarders of the Jewish state as according to the UN partition plan.

The outcome of the Dalet Plan was the occupation of the major coastal cities: Haifa, Jaffa and Acre, and the destruction of dozens of Palestinian villages.

The first Palestinian city to fall was Tiberius, April 16 1948, followed by Haifa, April 21 and Jaffa, May 13 and Acre, May 16. The attacks of the well organized and equipped Israeli forces were faced by unorganized resistance and local militias which were without a coherent leadership.

The horrors of the massacre of Deir Yassin, April 9 1948, will be repeated in different places and ways, and the major part of the ethnic cleansing was already achieved before the beginning of the Arab Israeli war in 1948.

I do not want to enter now in the myth of the Israeli David facing the Arab Goliath, because the facts of the military Israeli supremacy are unveiled now. But what I want to sign out here is that the ethnic cleansing of Palestine was not an outcome of a war but one of its reasons,  and that the transfer of the Palestinians, first mentioned in the Peel plan, was the major element in the project of the occupation of Palestine by a colonial movement.    

 One can speak here about the errors, the weakness, and the lack of leadership in the Palestinian ranks, but this weakness justifies nothing, yes they clarify the situation but the weakness of the oppressed can never justify the acts of the oppressors.

The Palestinian novelist Ghassan kanafani, in his novel “Return to Haifa” formulated the question of weakness and mistakes with these words: “When are you going to stop considering the weakness and mistakes of others are endorsed over to the account of your own prerogatives? …  And you, do you believe we’ll continue making mistakes? If we should stop making mistakes one day, what would be left for you then?

The myth of the peace process

Edward Said considered the Oslo Agreement as a major Palestinian mistake. For The author of “Orientalism” the Palestinian leadership did not learn from the lessons of history, and accepted to sign an agreement that did not solve the main issue which in his words is the struggle between present and interpretation. The Palestinian present is interpreted by the dominant Israeli discourse as an absence. Thus the notion of the present absents (a legal Israeli term to describe the Palestinians who were displaced inside the state of Israel), will become now extend to the Palestinians in the occupied territories who are living under a problematic autonomy, witnessing and struggling against the Israeli project of their political disappearance, and against the creation of new facts represented by the Jewish colonies that are spreading all over the occupied West Bank.

The historical development has proved that Said’s hypothesis was not baseless. But I would like to read the so called peace process beyond the notion of historical errors. My hypothesis is that the adequate word to describe it is “surrender”. The Palestinian leadership did not exchange its recognition of the state of Israel with the recognition of the right of The Palestinian people to self-determination, but with the recognition of the P.L.O.

On the other hand the P.L.O. made a huge concession when it renounced to the rights of the Palestinians in 78 percent of Palestine and accepted a new partition of the land which goes far beyond what was given to the Jewish state in the U.N. partition plan. This was surrender by all means. And like all surrenders the defeated that recognizes his defeat will defend mainly his right to exist. This is my reading of the Oslo Agreements. The Palestinians accepted the unacceptable in order to survive, or at least this is what the leadership of the PLO thought.

The total failure of these agreements showed that the Israeli establishment is unwilling and may be unable to accept the idea of the partition of the land between two sovereign states. This inability is not the outcome of the policies of the Israeli right wing governments, as most people think. Actually the failure was declared under the Ehud Barak labor government in the Camp David negotiations in 2000, which led to the second Intifada.

The dead end of the peace process finds its reasons in the refusal of the Israeli establishment to accept a Palestinian surrender, because accepting such surrender is a way, even if it is oblique, to recognize the Palestinian present, and to dismiss its interpretation as an absence.

This will lead us to the fact that the Nakba is not a historical event, that began and ended in 1948, but a process that began in 1948 and is still continuing, and there are no signs that it will stop in the coming future.

The Palestinian writer Raef Zreik suggested that any serious discussion must take us to 1948. The point of departure in rethinking the future of Palestine/Israel must be the Nakba not as a historical fact only, but also in its manifestations now.

This is a great intellectual and political task, reading the continuous Nakba in a perspective of justice, equality and peace, needs new approaches that will take us beyond the mythical, nationalistic and religious claims, towards discovering a new way that will decolonize the land and liberates its inhabitants from the illusion of building the present with the stones of a messianic and/or apocalyptic past.

Does this means a bi-national state, or two states in one confederation, or a Middle Eastern democratic and socialist confederation? I don’t know, all what I know is that there must be a new way of thinking that will pave the way for the struggle for freedom and liberation.

Unveiling the myths does not necessarily lead to a solution; it can also lead to an arrogant nationalistic discourse, as it is the case with the New Zionists Historians, who are giving legitimacy to the crime, through admitting it. This phenomenon demonstrates how the ideology of our savage capitalist era can lead to a discourse that despises the human sufferings, and become prisoner of a racist religious nationalist project, whether it is a Jewish State that wants its victims to recognize its Jewish nature thus losing all their rights, or an Islamic state, that is unable to recognize that The Arab Mashreq (The Levant) was and will continue to be a land of diversity.

I am suggesting that the best way to read Palestine is to read it as a question. Palestine is the question of the human conscious in our times.. Reading it only as a national question will make from the victims of the holocaust the victimizers of the Palestinians.

I want to end my intervention with the story related by the Israeli New Historian Ilan Pappe in his book “The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine”, about the occupation and destruction of the Palestinian village Sa’a’ in February 14 1948. The commander of the Israeli battalion Moshe Kalman responsible for the attack told the New York Times (April 14 1948) that the Jewish troops encountered no resistance from the residents as they entered the village and began attaching T.N.T. to the houses. “We ran into an Arab guard”, Kalman recounted, “he was so surprised that he didn’t ask min hada? Who is it? But eish hada?  What is it? One of our troops who knew Arabic responded humorously hada (this is in Arabic) eish (fire in Hebrew) and shot a volley into him”.

This story reveals the difference between questions and answers, instead of questioning what was and is still going on, the soldier transformed  the Arabic- Hebrew mixture in his reply to bullets that shot the question  and the killed the poor peasant who dared to ask.

Between the Arabic eish (what) and the Hebrew eish (fire) lays the tragedy of Palestine/ Israel. If we will continue to treat the issue as an answer then the eish or fire will not only burn the forest, as it is the case in the story of A.B.Yehoshua but will burn also the Israeli forest’s watcher and the mute Palestinian peasant, and the whole region.“

In December 2012 Yanis Varoufakis, meanwhile Minister of Finance in Greece, had been invited by Robert Misik/Genial dagegen, to the Bruno Kreisky Forum for international Dialogue.  His main theme: the European Crises in it’s Global context.

Visit Varoufakis’ blogroll thoughts for the post-2008 world to listen to his speech.

The Charlie Hebdo Attack And What It Reveals About Society

Political assassination is as old as humanity and the chances that it will be dead before humanity dies are dim. Violence is an un-detachable companion of inter-human antagonisms and conflicts – and those in turn are part and parcel of the human condition. In various times, however, political murders tended to be aimed at different kinds of victims.

Read the Interview

This volume, published by Bruno Kreisky Forum for International Dialogue and the S&D Group in the European Parliament, editetd by Bashir Bashir and Azar Dakwar, brings together the voices and views of leading Palestinian, Israeli Jewish and European intellectuals, politicians and activists, who prpose alternative approaches and „out of the box“ thinking on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. More specifically, this unique volume aims to contribute to the emerging efforts of re-examining the current strategies and paradigms through proposing and exploring new perspectives, visionary discourses and alternatives to partition in the case of the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Put differntly, it seeks to enrich European public discourse with original and refreshing views and alternative paradigms to settling this lingering conflict.

We present the volume as eBook. To order the free of charge coverversion please send an email to kreiskyforum@kreisky.org

Douze personnes ont trouvé la mort dans l’attaque du siège de Charlie Hebdo, dans le centre de Paris, mercredi 7 janvier. Onze personnes ont également été blessées par les assaillants, dont quatre grièvement, parmi lesquels le journaliste Philippe Lançon et deux policiers.

Artikel von Le Monde

Netanyahu disrupted during congress by a brave Jewish girl who exposes Israel, to be tackled by AIPAC .

Rae Abileah, a 28-year old Jewish daughter of an Israeli, is a member of Code Pink, a pacifist organization. She told Ynet that she had disrupted another speech by Netanyahu at the Jewish Federations General Assembly in New Orleans in November.