

Im Rahmen der Veranstaltungsreihe

ANNA POLITKOWSKAJA LECTURES

lädt das

Bruno Kreisky Forum für internationalen Dialog

zum Vortrag von

Alexej Simonow

Zensur, Unterdrückung und Verfolgung von Journalisten unter Putin

Kommentar von

Nina L. Chruschtschowa

Anschließend Präsentation der Bücher

"Töchter des Krieges. Überleben in Tschetschenien"

von **Susanne Scholl**

und **"Russland ohne Anna Politkowskaja"**

von **Garri Kasparow**

Montag | 8. Oktober 2007 | 19.00 Uhr

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Without Anna Politkovskaya: The Year of Fear

In the year since Anna Politkovskaya's death it has become clear - fear has returned to Russia. After 1956 Nikita Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" which denounced the consequences of Joseph Stalin's cult of personality, the country was slowly becoming free from those consequences, and from fear - from fear of saying the wrong thing, from fear of giving the wrong look, or writing the wrong book or speaking the wrong word...

Of course there were ups and downs, the 1970s Leonid Brezhnev era of stagnation was a fearful time as well, but the general trend in the Russian society was towards openness, freedom, liberalism. After the 1960s there was still a believe and a hope (even if only whispered in the kitchen) that one day we would completely wake up from fear and would indeed become a free and open society. We did, indeed: first with Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika in the 1980s, and then in 1991 with Boris Yeltsin-led collapse of communism.

We remained free until 2001, when Vladimir Putin came into power. But despite the counter-reforms he instigated, in essence curtailing the freedom of the press, the non-governmental organization, independent judiciary and other institutions of democracy and civil society, until 2006 we still believed we were free, free enough, we thought.

If Anna Politkovskaya, we reasoned, could openly write what she writes—courageously and without holding back—on the Chechen war, on corruption, on contract killings, etc., we must still be free... Her murder a year ago signified that Russia had made full circle, now speeding back to the pre-1956 condition.

True, it would be unfair to say that Putin's era has been more frightening than that of Leonid Brezhnev, but it is our trend backwards that is terrifying. With no communism or the Gulags, with the relatively open borders and free trade, how did we make this full circle, turning the tide back towards fear and obedience?

In 2007 there are consequences, again - death, threats, reprimands - if one writes news reports about Chechnya or opinion pieces about Putin. Fifty years after de-Stalinization, the fear in Russia has won, again.

(Nina L. Chruschtschowa, September 2007)

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DIE VERANSTALTUNG IST GEFÖRDERT AUS DEN MITTELN DER REPUBLIK ÖSTERREICH UND DER STADT WIEN

Gertraud Auer

Good evening and welcome in the Bruno Kreisky Forum, a very special warm welcome to our guests of tonight, Prof. Simonow, Nina Chruschtschowa, and Susanne Scholl. Tonight we pay tribute to Anna Politkowskaja. A year ago Anna was shot and today her killer is still not identified. Her murderer killed a woman who was committed to freedom, to democracy, to human rights, to humanity. The international

community lost a journalist who spoke about the war, the weak, the forgotten, and the people without a voice. The Bruno Kreisky Forum has decided to honor her memory by inviting people who pursue her memory and her courageous path. Irina Scherbakowa and Sergej Kowaljow from Memoria, Sergej Sokolow and Galina Musaliewa, her colleagues from *Novaja Gazeta*, and Garri Kasparow were already our guests.

Let me shortly introduce the program of tonight. Prof. Simonow, who is the President of Glasnost Defense Foundation will give a speech about “Impunity for Perpetrators of Crimes against Journalists as a Direct Consequence of the Poor Quality of Russia’s Justice System” followed by a statement of Nina Chruschtschowa. And then we will present two books. Both of them are dedicated to Anna Politkowskaja. One is the book written by Susanne Scholl *Töchter des Krieges* which was published by Molden Verlag. Susanne will read some paragraphs of the book and will speak about her work. And the other one is *Russland nach Anna Politkowskaja* by Garri Kasparow who was lecturing here at the Bruno Kreisky Forum half a year ago. We thought with the publisher Peter Engelmann from the Passagenverlag to publish his lecture and to widen it up with some commentaries.

Meine sehr geehrten Damen und Herren, ich danke Ihnen, dass Sie so zahlreich zu diesem Gedenkabend gekommen sind, und darf Prof. Simonow bitten, auf das Podium zu kommen.

Alexej Simonow

This is an issue of *Novaja Gazeta* which was published yesterday. I came today. It is all dedicated to Anna. And its first words are from the interview of the main investigator of her case: “The arrests will go on and we know who is the killer.” That is the main outcome of what he is doing. The killer was not accused yet, but we know who he is. That is what is going on concerning Anna. Yesterday in Moscow there were five events dedicated to the anniversary of her killing. There was a meeting on Pushkinskaja Square. I was one of the speakers at that meeting. But I must say that sadly it was more political than memorial because her death is a part of the opposition activities. That is no good for me. But it is the politicized version of our life. Then there was a very interesting photo exhibition in the open air with about a hundred photos, most of them dedicated to the Chechen war and some of them dedicated to Anna and her activities. Then there was a musical concert in the House of Journalists. But the hall in the House of Journalists is small, so there were not too many people there. There was a kind of a memorial in *Novaja Gazeta* which I also attended. And there we just drank vodka and remembered her, together with different kinds of her friends including political, non-political, journalist, non-journalist, Chechen, not-Chechen.

What had happened to her shows that the impunity of those who investigate the journalist cases, the cases of the killed journalists is total. Anna’s investigation belongs to app. 5% of the killings of journalists which happened during the last fifteen years. We count them. Our list is one of the fullest lists. Anna was 211 on this list.

The number of crimes against journalists cited in statements, reports or ratings by various Russian and international organizations defending journalists’ rights, such as the CPJ, Reporters Without Borders, the Center for Extreme Reporting, the World Press Institute and so on, varies considerably. Why? As an illustration, here is just one hypothetical situation. Suppose a crew of reporters for a certain TV channel dies halfway between the editorial office and the site of the car crash they had the misfortune to get into. The road accident was provoked by a truck that had turned up out of nowhere. Although it seems clear that the journalists died while doing their professional job (otherwise, why drive at full speed anywhere?), but the situation is such that they cannot possibly be put on the list of victims of criminal violence. But questions come up. What if the truck driver is alive and just drove away from the site of the crash? And where were the reporters driving – to the location where they were to shoot a report or already back to the office? And was the report they had presumably made actually shown on TV later? And have the police

tracked down the runaway truck driver? And did he happen to be in any way connected with the organization described in the report?

Without answering those and many other important questions, one cannot feel fully justified leaving the names of such journalists outside the list. And all those questions can only be answered by the investigators who, as it often happens, are keeping silent. Or take the worldwide-known assassination of the popular TV anchor Vlad Listyev whose name is on the victims list and whose murder was mourned by the entire nation. Yet his death was not linked to his journalistic activities; he was killed for attempting to re-divide commercial air time on the ORT channel. So how should we deal with that kind of cases? Murder statistics is a product of the most careful case-by-case analysis. And as regards Listyev's killers, they have not been found up until now.

We at the Glasnost Defense Foundation have a way of keeping record of all cases of journalists' non-violent deaths in connection with their professional work, unless the police or prosecutor's office have presented convincing evidence that a journalist died in an accident that has been looked upon through the prism of the content of that journalist's reports, planned or published, or – still better – of the judicial decisions passed on his or her case. Each particular organization's approach to matters of this kind is purely subjective, which is what makes the statistical figures vary as strikingly as they do.

In last October's special issue of a newspaper dedicated to the killing of Anna Politkovskaya, we published a list of journalists and other media workers who had died in Russia over the 15-year period between 1992 and 2006. Although by far not exhaustive, with 211 names, that list enables us to draw some conclusions as to how and what for we have been paying with our colleagues' lives.

The first and bloodiest category of deaths is reporters' killing in armed confrontations. Over the past 15 years we have gone through three major armed confrontations, of which two can rightfully be called wars. The first was in October '93, when five journalists were shot and killed from the besieged Ostankino TV Center, and two more died inside the Center and near the White House. That made a total of 7 journalists killed over two days' time, on the 3rd and 4th of October, 1993. The circumstances of their deaths were investigated only by their colleagues, with the findings and a list of other crimes against reporters – from injuries to the confiscation of photo films and video cassettes – were handed over at a press conference to the Interior Minister, only to vanish without a trace despite his repeated promises to look into each case carefully and openly.

The second armed confrontation was the Chechen war which lasted for nearly two years, from November '94 to August '96. Face to face with incessant official lies and misinformation, courageous Russian journalists proudly passed a test of valor and love of freedom, paying for that a much higher price: our 20 colleagues were killed and 3 more were reported missing.

The first Chechen war was clearly a civil war, with two belligerents confronting each other without a frontline, and with reporters working on both sides of that non-existent frontline. One well-known case, in which journalist Natalya Alyakina-Mrozek was shot and killed by a careless draftee from a tank-mounted submachine-gun, went all the way to court. In another case, in which the U.S. photo correspondent Cynthia Elbaum died in the explosion of a bomb dropped from an unidentified aircraft, actually no investigation followed; and the sole thing known about the majority of reporters who died in Chechnya during that war is that they were "killed by unidentified persons". The number of those victims totaled seven, with not a single killer tracked down and no judicial hearings held at all, although that group of victims included reporters for both federal and foreign print media and TV channels.

It was this lack of effective judicial instruments that allowed the ruling elite on the eve of the second war in Chechnya to bar the journalists from the warfare areas and deprive them of the opportunity to see and record the actual developments independently. Instead, a tough system of journalists' accreditation was

introduced in October 1999, together with a network of press centers to ration out information to reporters the way the official propagandists saw it right.

As a result, fewer journalists died in the second Chechen war – only 6 during the first and most vigorous period of resumed warfare. But the cancer tumor of hatred, ever less treated legislatively, produced numerous and long-standing metastases which have remained a major source of pain up until now: one journalist died in a combat helicopter blown up by militants in 2002, together with the crew and all the other passengers; another died in the stadium explosion which also took the life of the Chechen President Akhmat Kadyrov in 2004; and a third one was burnt up in a passenger airplane blown up by terrorists later that year. Actually, the assassination of Anna Politkovskaya on October 7th, 2006 is deemed to have had its roots in the Chechen war, too. Both wars in Chechnya were undeclared wars where all the notions were distorted and it was impossible to tell the front from the rear; where prisoners of war were called hostages; and where killing an enemy was seen as a heroic deed and seizing a piece of ground was thought to be a temporary and often senseless thing to do.

On the whole, however, one can suppose that the lost lives of those journalists is the price which humanity has had to pay for the right to know what is going on in the “hot spots”.

But two thirds of the victims – more than 140 Russian journalists – died in peacetime, when one would expect the rule of law to triumph and to see the law enforcers earn their money by honestly doing their job; when we as citizens and members of the media community would expect to be entitled to know how and why our colleagues were killed, and who has been held liable for their deaths, and to what extent those tragedies were connected with the victims’ professional activities and the subject matter of their written, oral or televised reports. Unfortunately, in more than 100 cases we do not know anything and are unlikely to learn it, ever.

“Never” is such a dull and dark word that it seems it cannot possibly have any tint, shade or hue at all. But if you come across it frequently enough, you start discerning shades even in the black darkness. Let me explain what kind of shades I refer to. For example, Natalya Astafyeva and Sergey Isakov, a crew of reporters for Channel One, died at the 165th kilometer of the highway connecting the cities of Khanty-Mansiysk and Tyumen, crashing with a heavy truck. Another road accident that occurred not far from the city of Sarapul in Udmurtia took the life of Firat Valeyev. The nuance is that Firat was editor of Bashkiria’s actually sole opposition newspaper and was taking the makeup of a fresh issue of that banned newspaper to the printing house when the crash occurred, leading many to call it a convenient way of doing away with an inconvenient journalist. However, the investigation findings failed to shed any light on the reasons for that road accident. Therefore, the Channel One crew members are deemed to have died fulfilling an editorial assignment and Firat – as a private individual, without any apparent link to journalistic work. I should perhaps explain that local authorities in Russia may prohibit all the printing firms on their territory to print a newspaper they do not like. That is why Firat Valeyev had to make shuttle drives to neighboring Udmurtia to get his newspaper printed.

Generally, of a total of 16 deaths of reporters in road or air crashes only two cases have been thoroughly investigated: when 3 journalists died in a helicopter crash together with the Krasnoyarsk Governor General Lebed while flying to cover the opening of a new downhill ski track; and when the head of the “Top Secret” media holding Artyom Borovik died together with the oil tycoon Zeya Bazhayev whose private airplane exploded – or fell apart – during takeoff. The two investigations were in-depth, long and conflict-fueling because official commissions’ comments differed substantially from what independent investigators from the journalistic community said. The official conclusions: “No terrorist acts, just clear-cut accidents” were approved by the government but many people are still expressing doubts.

Now let us look at the most widespread and most banal kind of killings – with kitchen knives, baseball bats, iron bars, nooses, etc. – as well as at accidental falls on stone stairs that have so often occurred all across Russia, from Moscow to Vladivostok and from Khabarovsk to St. Petersburg.

Before proceeding to analyze those killings, I would like to give you a generalized characteristic of journalists that can be gathered from law enforcers' replies to our inquiries about the reasons for our colleagues' deaths:

“Journalists are the most scandalous section of the population. They drink too much and deceive their spouses too often. They have an inflated sense of self-respect and are prone to sexual oddities. Journalists disregard government authorities, see themselves as the supreme authority, and are ready to sell the usurped power functions right and left. They are opposition-minded and categorical in their assessments. They are permanently present at the sites of social conflicts, and one has neither the time nor the opportunity to discern them from the conflicting parties. Journalists are characterized by arrogance which they tend to describe as dignity, and by unhealthy curiosity which they often try to pass for professional inquisitiveness.”

As applied to individual journalists, some of those characteristics would be fair and correct. We are not angels. But I could hardly name another country where only angels are killed.

Each time a journalist dies in what can be described as a “household” conflict, the question arises as to whether it was an accident or a preordered murder. In most cases this question is left unanswered. In those few cases where the answer is found, it is invariably this: “It was an accident.” The death of Novaya Gazeta reporter Igor Domnikov resulting from a hammer blow on the head in the year 2000 was declared an “accident”, too. Actually, the sole accidental thing about it was that five years later, while investigating numerous murders committed by a crime ring based in Tatarstan, the police established that one of the characters of Igor's critical articles had ordered his beating which had ended fatally because the executors had grown “too enthusiastic” about fulfilling the order. All the perpetrators, including the killers, the ordering party and even the mediator, were identified. But the person who ordered the crime has never been called to justice. Of a total of 30 cases of reporters found dead with knife stabs or broken skulls, the vast majority have been investigated in a purely formal manner and closed with the standard motivation: “No suspects have been identified.”

Here are just a few names: Yuri Soltys, Interfax news agency reporter, Moscow, June 1994 – no killers found; Yaroslav Zvyaltsev, Magnitogorsk, December 1995 – the reasons behind his death unknown, no killers found; Viktor Mikhailov, Chita, May 1996 – no killers found; Vyacheslav Zvonaryov, Kursk, 1997 – no killers found. This sad list grows several names longer every year.

Cases where the perpetrators have been tracked down, detained and prosecuted can be counted with the fingers of one hand. None of those are deemed to have been connected with the victims' professional activities, like the tragedy in the Altai Territory where an underage rotter killed a journalist and all his family members who were sleeping in a tourist tent, and drove the victim's old car all night long for fun with his girlfriends. It appears the Russian law enforcers find it easier to disclose a murder unrelated to journalistic activities. Indeed, they can write it off as a road accident, a chance encounter with a hooligan, or a drunken brawl – but even in that event one can hear false notes in the law enforcers' comments.

Vladimir Aliyev from the town of Prokhladnoye in Kabardino-Balkaria died in March 1997 during questioning at a local police station. An explanation note we have received from the local prosecutor's office says the journalist died as a result of – I quote – “falling down from his own full height” – and this about a man found lying face down with a basal skull fracture.

Leonid Kuznetsov, editor of the small district newspaper Meshcherskaya Nov, died in the region of Ryazan in the summer of 2002 – according to the investigators, as a result of falling down from his bike and hitting his head against a piece of rock. Our colleagues, a lawyer and a reporter, drove to the town of Kasimov where the editor had died while carrying part of the circulation of his independent newspaper from a printing house in a neighboring town. They carefully explored a whole kilometer of the highway which Leonid had been riding along, and did not find a single piece of rock or stone leaping to the eye. Instead, in a nearby village they found an eyewitness who told them something had happened on the highway, like someone had been ridden over, on the day of Leonid's death. The newly surfaced evidence, however, did not cause the law enforcers to review the case.

In this context, one has every reason to think that the prosecutor's office – the agency commissioned to supervise the efficiency of the law enforcement process – eagerly turns a blind eye to police arbitrariness or inaction. Whenever a physician is killed, the first thing that is checked is whether the murder may have resulted from some damage the victim may have done to someone of his patients. It is indeed a puzzle why this kind of motivation is never considered in the event of a reporter's death, despite the fact that journalists seldom treat their own "patients" – in inverted commas – tenderly or delicately. And they aren't expected to, really.

The next category is the victims of firearms. Journalists have been shot and killed everywhere: in Moscow and in the Maritime Territory, in Smolensk and in the Sverdlovsk Region. The two most notorious killings of the past few years – of Paul Khlebnikov and Anna Politkovskaya – belong within that category, too. But first, a few words about the amazing city of Togliatti where six media editors-in-chief were killed between 1995 and 2003; four of them got the lead. That city's justice system looks particularly helpless and inefficient: not a single killer has been identified or convicted in any of the six cases. It looks like we have a piece of the Wild West down on the Volga River. Let's look at two cases which I know in every detail – the murders of two editors-in-chief of one and the same newspaper, Togliattinskoye Obozreniye, that followed each other at an interval of 18 months: Valery Ivanov was killed in April 2002 and Alexei Sidorov in October 2003. The two cases reveal not only a common style of law enforcers' performance but also a common source of high-ranking protection. As far as their style is concerned, it makes one recall the popular joke: "If you ask a Russian law enforcer how to catch a lion in a desert, he would be sure to tell you without hesitation: 'You catch a hare and beat him until he admits he is a lion.'"

As for the high-ranking protection, both cases were supervised by Russia's First Deputy Prosecutor General Vladimir Kolesnikov. The scenario of law enforcers' quasi-activity was one and the same. A journalist gets killed – Mr. Kolesnikov arrives to announce shortly that the murder has actually been disclosed and the perpetrators are already under arrest. In the case of Valery Ivanov, three "hares" were caught, and in that of Alexei Sidorov – one "hare". Then, in full accordance with the scenario, the detainees allegedly confess to the crime and the investigators proceed to prepare the documents for trial. In the case of Ivanov, no trial ever took place: one of the suspects quietly passed away and the two others were released because their involvement in the crime could not be proven. In the Sidorov case, the "sacrificial hare", welder Yevgeny Maininger, was defended by our Foundation's lawyers and, having spent a year in detention, was released. During that year the prosecutors had failed not only to persuade the court he was guilty but also to prove that he had had anything at all to do with Sidorov's killing! And – nothing followed. None of the prosecutors was held liable for their outrageous incompetence; on the contrary, they all have continued working their careers up. And Mr. Kolesnikov has successfully swapped the Deputy Prosecutor General's chair for that of a Deputy Justice Minister.

Now it seems the right time to talk about the professional level of our law enforcers and, in a broader sense, about the quality of Russia's justice system as a whole. What is it that hampers their efficient work?

Let us consider a case that from the judicial viewpoint might be called nothing out of the ordinary. Larissa Yudina, editor of the newspaper *Sovetskaya Kalmykia*, was brutally murdered in the Kalmyk capital Elista on June 7, 1998. Two days later her killers were arrested, tried and convicted. But as early as then it was clear – and it is as clear today – that those convicts had not had any motive whatsoever to kill the lady editor; that it was a preordered murder; and that any of us, including the investigators, could point to the persons who had organized that murder – the President of the Elista Bank and the President of the Republic of Kalmykia, both bearing the name Ilyumzhinov. Although the case was handled by investigators from a neighboring region that is not controlled by the Ilyumzhinov clique, the names of the real organizers were never announced officially.

“If only we had a system of witness protection!” one investigator mused. “In that event, we might get all the way down to the organizers.”

There is no workable system of that kind in Russia, and the organizers still go unpunished.

The case of reporter Dmitry Kholodov’s murder twice fell apart in court – either the investigators failed to present evidence that the jury might find convincing, or else the jury members may have been persuaded in advance not to accept that evidence. Similarly, on the pretext of lack of convincing proofs, a jury panel released the suspected killers of Paul Khlebnikov. Ever since a system of jury trials was introduced in Russia, the investigators’ helplessness in gathering convincing evidence has been strikingly clear. And a new problem has emerged: jury panels and their verdicts may be subject to manipulation. Not a single suspect has so far been identified in the case of the TV anchor Vladislav Listyev who was shot and killed near his home house on March 1, 1995. That case has never even been submitted to court. Another instance of mockery at the administration of justice is the case of Vladimir Kirsanov, the missing editor of the newspaper *Kurganskiye Vesti*. Investigation of his disappearance has several times been resumed under public opinion pressure, but each time it ground to a halt because nothing beyond stains of blood in his personal car had been found. And on May 17 this year, the law enforcers banned the picketing action which is annually held by Kurgan journalists to mark the alleged date of Kirsanov’s death. Those who failed to track down the editor’s killers do not want to be reminded by the public of their own professional inadequacy.

However unreliable and unprofessional they may be in exploring the murder-or-accident dilemma, our police officers and prosecutors cannot be substituted for. At least we the media workers cannot possibly act in their stead. The best thing we can do is raise the money to hire a good lawyer and see to it that the investigators do not shirk their work or breach the law-established norms.

Eager to keep the investigation process under control, our Foundation has regularly exchanged information with the Office of the Russian Federation Prosecutor General since January 2004. By April 2007 we had informed them of 238 crimes against journalists and got appropriate feedback on each case.

Today, we have sufficient factual information to evaluate the efficiency of Russia’s law enforcement agencies statistically.

According to the Interior Ministry reports on the crime rate in Russia in 2004-2006, that is, during the same three-year period to which I referred earlier, about one half of all graver and particularly grave crimes were disclosed. The rate of disclosure of murders and murder attempts was as high as 80 percent, which is very good indeed.

Now, let us compare the figures supplied by the Prosecutor General’s Office which puts the number of grave crimes against journalists clearly linked with the victims’ professional activities at a total of 90 between 2004 and 2006, including only 11 cases submitted to court (as for the rest, the investigation is still not over, or the case has been closed, or no criminal proceedings have been instituted at all). Of those

11 cases, only one has been seen through to the end: the investigators worked well, and the perpetrator was tracked down and convicted. That slashes the disclosure rate to only 9 percent, which is much lower than the nation's average.

But if we look at all, not only the graver, crimes against journalists, we will see that only 5 of a total of 238 such cases have been disclosed, bringing the disclosure rate further down to a mere 2 percent, with the results of investigation into 121 crimes – more than one half of the total – still remaining unknown.

Actually, those figures show that crimes against media workers in Russia are not investigated at all or are investigated poorly – much worse than on average throughout the country.

Our force agencies lack people, funds, equipment, professionalism, education, conscience and other things that are deemed essential for efficient work. A large number of graver crimes against journalists are preordered crimes which are always difficult to investigate. One might feel sorry for Russia's law enforcers – unless the results of their miserable performance were not paid for – excuse me for the pathos – by the blood and lives of our colleagues. As a result, reporters have been growing ever more reluctant to honestly do their job. Actually, this creates a system where the simple fulfillment of one's professional duty is seen almost as heroism.

I couldn't fail to mention yet another kind of violence against journalists. This systemic, government-fueled violence has been caused by the recent series of Dissenters' Marches that took place in four Russian cities. During those marches – or, rather, during their dispersal – dozens of reporters were detained or beaten up. The government praised security services for their resolute actions, and the majority of maltreated journalists were accused of administrative offenses and sentenced to monetary fines. There were reporters for foreign-based newspapers and TV companies among them. Only one sued the police for unlawful behavior. The rest did not file any protests at all: they must be getting used to living in Russia the way most Russians do.

Now, here are some specific conclusions.

Journalists need to be more consistent in defending their own rights. So far, few have taken legal action against people who encroached upon their life or physical integrity.

We bear some corporate responsibility for that, too, because the beating of some of our colleagues has caused others to come up with ironic or plainly humiliating comments.

Some Russian publications about the killing of Anna Politkovskaya were outrageously mean and cynical. While the rest of the world was holding memorial rallies to mourn her death and awarding the most prestigious journalistic prizes to her posthumously, some Russian newspapers whispered maliciously that Anna had had U.S. citizenship – as if that made her less dead or less brutally murdered.

Beating reporters or charging them with participation in the organization of protest rallies or marches is inadmissible; this practice must be ended once and for all. And whether or not they sympathize with the protesters is by no means a matter to be reviewed in court.

Where murders and other grave crimes against media workers are concerned, identifying the executors is not sufficient. The people who ordered those crimes must be tracked down by all means; without that, even what seems to be the fairest verdict should not be accepted by the international community.

It is useless to write protest messages because these are left unanswered. President Putin and his administration are deaf to public appeals. Perhaps it is time to review strategies and start acting via national governments and international community organizations in the first place.

Thank you.

Nina Chruschtschowa

Thank you very much. First I want to thank the Kreisky Forum for inviting me to speak here the second time around and also for the interest in the Russian plague because the human rights situation is getting worse by the day. I really want to thank you all for still being interested in it, for not giving up. My statement is very brief. I even have a title for it which is

Without Anna Politkovskaya: The Year of Fear

When last week President Putin declared the possibility for him to become Russia's new Prime Minister, that is to move from one high office of Russian power in the Kremlin to another high office in the White House which is the seat of the Russian parliament, it became totally clear, Putin is forever and Russia now is all but officially an autocracy. An autocracy once again in the 21st century when autocracies have been discredited and dismantled all over the civilized world.

In a year since Anna Politkovskaya's death it has become clear—fear of an autocratic crew has returned to Russia. After 1956 Nikita Khrushchev's "Secret Speech," which denounced the consequences of Joseph Stalin's cult of personality, the country was slowly becoming free from those consequences, and from fear—from fear of saying the wrong thing, from fear of having the wrong look, from fear of writing the wrong book or speaking the wrong word...

Of course there were ups and downs, the 1970s Leonid Brezhnev autocratic era of stagnation was a fearful time as well, but the general trend in the Russian society was away from autocracy towards democracy, towards openness, freedom, and liberalism. After the 1960s there was still a belief, even if only whispered in the kitchen, that one day we would become a country where it is not one man's personal decisions but the legal institutions there recognized and respected. We hoped we would completely wake up from fear and would indeed become a free and open society. We did, indeed, get very close to this dream, first with Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika in the 1980s, and then in 1991 with Boris Yeltsin-led collapse of communism. As imperfect as their democratizing attempts were, the fear of the state had gone from our lives. Obviously it was replaced by another fear, of making individual decisions, of holding responsibility for one's own life. But those personal defeats or successes like in any normal country did not represent the exploits and victories of the state.

We remained free from the state until 2000, when Vladimir Putin came into power. But despite the counter-reforms he instigated, in essence curtailing the freedoms of the press, the non-governmental organizations, independent judiciary, and other institutions of democracy and civil society, until 2006 we still believed we were free, free enough, we thought.

If Anna Politkovskaya, we reasoned, could openly write what she writes—courageously and without holding back—on the Chechen war, on corruption, on contract killings, etc., we must be free. Her murder a year ago signified that Russia had made full circle, now speeding back to the pre-1956 condition to an absolutist state ruled by the whim of one man.

True, it would be unfair to say that Putin's era has been more frightening than that of Leonid Brezhnev and more certainly that of Stalin, but it is our trend backwards that is terrifying. With no communism or the Gulags, with the relatively open borders and reasonably free trade, how did we make this full circle, turning the tide back towards the never ending one man's rule, towards the fear of possible repressions, if one is critical of Putin, disloyal to his new cult of personality?

In 2007 there are consequences, again--death, threats, and reprimands--if one writes news reports about Chechnya or opinion pieces about Putin. Fifty years after de-Stalinization, the fear in Russia has won, again. Thank you.

Susanne Scholl

Dieses Buch, das ich heute vorstellen möchte, war eigentlich überhaupt nicht geplant. Es ist entstanden nach einer Reise, die wir nach Tschetschenien gemacht haben, in der wir nach dem Tod von Anna Politkowskaja versucht haben, ihren Spuren zu folgen. Wir haben mit vielen Leuten geredet, die sie getroffen hat, die sie gekannt haben. Alle haben wie mit einer Stimme gesagt, dass ihr Tod ein ganz furchtbarer Schlag für Tschetschenien ist, weil auf diese Art die einzige Stimme, die die Tschetschen außerhalb Tschetscheniens hatten, verstummt ist. Ich habe danach auch in Moskau noch mit sehr vielen tschetschenischen Frauen gesprochen. Im Zuge dieser Gespräche bin ich zu dem Schluss gekommen, dass der Tschetschenienkrieg die Männer verroht hat, die Frauen aber zwei- und dreifach zu Opfern gemacht hat. Über die Frauen spricht man nicht. Man spricht über die, die den Krieg führen. Das sind nun mal meistens die Männer. Man spricht über Waffengänge und über Frontverläufe und über Terroranschläge ausgeübt meistens von Männern. Man spricht nicht über den Alltag im Krieg. Das ist so überall auf der Welt.

In Tschetschenien war es deshalb besonders schlimm, weil es zwei Kriege waren, weil Tschetschenien darüber hinaus eigentlich so wie die Menschen im ganzen Nordkaukasus oder wie im Kaukasus insgesamt seit mehr als zweihundert Jahren eigentlich einer unglaublichen Verfolgung ausgesetzt sind und weil sie im Grund genommen keine Chance haben. Sie können eigentlich nur in Tschetschenien leben. Überall außerhalb Tschetscheniens betrachtet man sie vom neugeborenen Baby bis zum alten Mann als Terroristen. Um das Leben in Tschetschenien in irgendeiner Form weitergehen zu lassen, hat es unglaublichen Muts und unglaublicher Kraft bedurft. Die haben eigentlich nur die Frauen aufgebracht. Die Männer sind mit den Waffen in den Krieg gezogen und völlig verroht zurückgekommen. Und die Frauen sind durch die Kriege in eine Situation zurückgestoßen worden, die sie zu Sowjetzeiten ein bisschen verloren hatten, nämlich in die Situation der absolut rechtlosen und der in Traditionen eingesperrte Menschen zweiter Klasse. Nun ist es nicht so, dass ich etwas gegen Situationen hätte. Und es ist mir bewusst, dass gerade in einer Situation wie in Tschetschenien, wo ein ganzes Volk unter Stalin deportiert wurde und dezimiert wurde, wo zwei Kriege furchtbare Löcher zurückgelassen haben, diese alten Traditionen, die alten Bräuche aus den Bergen, wie sie das gerne selber nennen, vielleicht die einzige Möglichkeit sind, so etwas wie eine eigene nationale Identität aufrechtzuerhalten. Nur leider sind in diesen Traditionen auch sehr viele Dinge enthalten, die eigentlich schon längst abgeschafft gehören oder der Vergangenheit angehören sollten, was sie vielleicht auch würden, hätte es nicht die Bomben auf Grosny zwei Mal hintereinander gegeben. Das ist eines der Themen in diesem Buch.

Es geht wirklich um den Alltag der Frauen in Tschetschenien. Es geht aber auch darum, wie eine Frau in Tschetschenien dazu kommt, mit einem Bombenrucksack in Moskau in ein Café zu gehen und diese Bombe am Ende dann doch nicht zu zünden. Es geht auch darum, ein bisschen aufzuklären, was die ominösen so genannten schwarzen Witwen tatsächlich sind, was wahr ist an der Tatsache, dass es Ausbildungslager für Selbstmordattentäterinnen gibt. Es geht auch darum, dass Tschetscheninnen und Tschetschenen, aber eben auch vor allem die Frauen, immer dann auch als Opfer herhalten müssen, wenn man von russischer Seite gerade wieder einmal einen Erfolg im so genannten Kampf gegen den internationalen Terrorismus vorweisen muss. Und es geht auch darum, dass eigentlich auch all jene Tschetscheninnen, die außerhalb Tschetscheniens leben, eine völlig idealisierte Vorstellung von ihrem Land haben und sich so wie alle, die in die Emigration gezwungen wurden und nicht freiwillig ihr Land verlassen haben, einfach zurücksehnen nach jenem Grosny, nach jenem Tschetschenien vor dem ersten Tschetschenienkrieg 1994, dass sie heute das Gefühl haben, es herrscht nicht mehr Krieg, aber es herrscht auch kein Frieden. Und auf jeden Fall ist man dort noch viel weiter von einem demokratischen Weg entfernt als in Russland insgesamt. Danke.

Peter Engelmann

Ich darf Sie herzlich begrüßen zur Präsentation des zweiten Buches heute Abend. Das Kreisky Forum hat vorgeschlagen, dass wir das in der Form einer Lesung des Vorwortes von André Glucksmann tun. Ich möchte dem Kreisky Forum danken für die wirklich gute Zusammenarbeit bei diesem Projekt, das sehr spontan entstanden ist im April. Manche werden dabei gewesen sein beim Vortrag von Garri Kasparow, der uns alle sehr beeindruckt hat. Bevor ich dem Auftrag der Lesung nachkomme, möchte ich noch ein, zwei Gedanken zu diesem Buch Ihnen geben. Das Buch ist der Vortrag und einige Texte dazu und Bildmaterial. Es gibt eine kurze Zeittafel der Putinokratie, wie Garri Kasparow das nennt, der Entwicklung der Herrschaft Putins in Richtung einer Autokratie, die wir jetzt schon als vollendet ansehen müssen. Was mich beim Vortrag von Garri Kasparow beeindruckt hat, war folgendes. Er hat natürlich ein sehr emotionales und beeindruckendes Plädoyer für Pressefreiheit gehalten. Er hat den Mord an Anna verdammt. Aber er hat zugleich verstanden, dass man Pressefreiheit, Bürgerrechte nicht isoliert einfordern kann, sondern dass sie zu einem größeren Ganzen gehören. Pressefreiheit, Bürgerrechte sind Teil der Zivilgesellschaft. Wir werden keinen Erfolg haben damit, sie isoliert einzufordern. Wir müssen immer Pressefreiheit als Moment der Entwicklung einer Zivilgesellschaft einfordern. Und das ist für mich die Lehre aus dem Vortrag von Garri Kasparow und aus dem Buch.

André Glucksmann, der das Vorwort zu diesem Buch geschrieben hat, ist Ihnen bekannt. Man kann seine politischen Positionen teilen oder nicht teilen. Wir haben auch darüber gesprochen. Aber unzweifelhaft ist er einer der wenigen westlichen Intellektuellen, die über die letzten Jahrzehnte hinweg für Menschenrechte, Pressefreiheit, gegen Völkermord gekämpft hat. Das kann man ihm nicht absprechen. Deswegen war Garri Kasparow auch einverstanden, dass er das Vorwort schreibt. Und wir haben uns gefreut, dass er das getan hat. Das Vorwort von André Glucksmann hat auch diesen wichtigen Punkt bei Garri Kasparow erkannt. Es rückt sein Engagement nicht nur in die Tradition der europäischen Nachkriegsoppositionen, die ja letztlich erfolgreich waren, sondern darüber hinaus stellt er die Arbeit, die politische Aktivität Kasparows, seinen Kampf für die Zivilgesellschaft auch in Russland, in die Tradition der Entwicklung der europäischen Zivilisation. Er ist ja nicht umsonst Philosoph und kann das ganz gut. Wichtig ist, dass dieses Element immer wieder betont wird, dass Reflektion und politische Aktivität zusammengehören. Ich denke, dass auch hier das eine ohne das andere nicht erfolgreich sein kann.

Ich darf jetzt das Vorwort von André Glucksmann zu dem Buch von Garri Kasparow lesen.

Wie viele Divisionen hat Kasparow?

Als die Panzer des Ostblocks den Prager Frühling zunichte machten, waren sie zu neun am roten Platz - neun Dissidenten, neun mutige Männer und Frauen, die die sowjetische Diktatur herausforderten. Nur einige wenige europäische Intellektuelle wurden aktiv und schafften es, diese einsamen Helden aus den psychiatrischen Krankenhäusern zu retten, in die sie von der politisch motivierten Polizei gesteckt worden waren. 21 Jahre später stellten die Regierungen und Führungsstäbe des Westens mit Erstaunen fest, dass diese Leichtgewichte - Solschenizyn, Sacharow, Bukowski und die Neun des August 1968 - das kommunistische Reich besiegt hatten.

Alle Großen dieser Welt erliegen dem Syndrom Stalins, das sich in den Worten „Wie viele Divisionen hat der Papst?“ ausdrückte. Leider berichtigen Tyrannen ihre Rechenfehler meist viel schneller als Demokraten und so versuchten jene Geheimdienste, in denen auch Putin groß wurde (und die ihn zuerst an die Spitze des KGB, später umbenannt in FSB, und im weiteren an jene Russlands brachten), Johannes Paul II. schon sehr bald zu beseitigen, noch lange bevor die demokratischen Regierungen den ungeheuren Freiheitsdurst und die Sehnsucht nach einem antitotalitären System entdeckten, zu deren Symbol Woytila wurde.

Angesichts des heute neu aufkommenden Widerstandes in Moskau rühren die moralischen und politischen Autoritäten keinen Finger. Die Regierungen in Paris, Rom, London und Berlin verschließen die Augen und wägen ab: Putin, sein Erdöl, sein Gas, seine Massenvernichtungswaffen und jene Waffen, die er auf der ganzen Erde verkauft, wiegen schwerer als einige Tausend Demonstranten, die von zehn mal zahlreicheren Polizeikräften geschlagen, zerstreut und festgenommen werden. Schröder wird weiterhin von Gazprom bezahlt. Chirac ging sang- und klanglos in Pension, ohne ein Wort des Bedauerns zu

äußern, weil er dem russischen Präsidenten das große Kreuz der Ehrenlegion auf die Brust gesteckt hatte. Prodi erinnerte sich sogar laut an die Lektüre seiner Jugend, wobei er vorgab, Putin mit Puschkin zu verwechseln.

Anna Politkowskaja wurde ermordet und ist schon vergessen, ebenso wie Dutzende Journalisten, die Opfer von Auftragsmorden wurden. Jene, die Recherchen über die Auftraggeber der Explosionen von Wohnhäusern anstellten, bei denen es mehr als 300 Todesopfer gab und die dem Kreml den willkommenen Vorwand lieferten, den Tschetschenienkrieg vom Zaun zu brechen, wurden ebenso aus dem Weg geräumt wie Litwinenko, der mit Polonium vergiftet wurde. Chodorkowski und Trepaschkin sitzen weit weg in Sibirien hinter Gittern. Jeder vierte oder fünfte Tschetschene ist tot. Heute werden Garri Kasparow und seine Freunde daran gehindert und bedroht, wenn sie mit einer Rose in einer Hand und der russischen Verfassung in der anderen demonstrieren wollen. Wie viel Köpfe müssen noch rollen, wie viele Menschen müssen noch mit dem Leben bezahlen, bis die Europäer, die Verfechter der Menschenrechte, endlich reagieren?

„Wenn in Europa 5000 Menschen demonstrieren, dann heißt das nicht viel. Aber in einem Land, wo die Teilnahme an einer Demonstration ernste Folgen nach sich ziehen kann, ist es eine Heldentat, wenn auch nur Tausend Demonstranten auf die Straße gehen“, erklärt der Schachmeister. Dies ist sicherlich noch eine Untertreibung, denn diese mutigen Demonstranten leben in einem Land, in dem, wie Anna Politkowskaja 2003 schrieb, „eine Kugel in den Kopf das einfachste und naheliegendste Mittel zur Lösung jeglichen Konflikts“ darstellt.

Aber aufgepasst - es geht keineswegs nur im Idealismus, Moral und Werte. Tugend und Realitätssinn, die Ethik der Überzeugung und Verantwortungsbewusstsein sind keineswegs Gegensatzpaare. Seit wann zeugt es denn von Realitätssinn, wenn man zulässt, dass am Rande der europäischen Union auf einem Sechstel der Erdoberfläche erneut eine autokratische Macht entsteht, die niemand kontrollieren kann außer dem Herrn des Kremls, seinen Geheimdiensten, seiner Armee und seiner Polizei? Hat man denn vergessen, dass Russland die Atommacht mit dem zweitgrößten Arsenal ist und unglaubliche gute Karten in der Hand hat, wenn es darum geht, andere zu erpressen? (Stichwort Öl und Erdgas) Wenn durch Zensur, Korruption, dunkle Machenschaften, Drohungen und Mord jegliche Kritik ausgeschaltet und jede Opposition zum Verstummen gebracht wird, dann wird niemand in der russischen Gesellschaft mehr für Demokratie, Vernunft, Verantwortungsbewusstsein, Vorsicht und Achtung vor dem Menschen eintreten. Habt ihr, die Großen Europas, denn gar nichts gelernt? Findet ihr es klug, alle internen Gegenkräfte ausschalten zu lassen, die vielleicht einen einzelnen Machthaber daran hindern könnten, wissentlich oder versehentlich den Planeten in die Luft zu jagen?

Muss man wirklich daran erinnern, wie Wladimir Putin in einer Ansprache an die Duma im April 2005 erklärte, dass „man anerkennen müsse, dass der Fall der UdSSR die größte geopolitische Katastrophe des Jahrhunderts sei“. Es sind für unseren großen Mann im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert somit weder Hiroshima noch Auschwitz, auch nicht die beiden Weltkriege und die Dutzenden Millionen Toten im Gulag, die die Bezeichnung „größte Katastrophe“ verdienen. Nein, für ihn ist es vielmehr das, was alle Demokraten dieser Erde, Kasparow, Sie und ich 1991 als Befreiung feierten – nämlich das Ende des sowjetischen Reiches. Das dem Erdboden gleichgemachte Grozny, die zu Hunderttausenden ermordeten tschetschenischen Zivilisten und die Abschaffung der ohnehin dürftigen Freiheiten der Meinungsäußerung in Russland selbst zeugen vom Wahn des Kremls, der in einer panischen Angst vor jeder Infragestellung besteht.

Kasparow hätte den goldenen und wohlverdienten Ruhestand eines fantastischen Champions genießen können. Er aber stellt sich mit Ernsthaftigkeit, in aller Klarheit und wagemutig seiner Verantwortung und führt uns die unsere vor Augen. Es ist höchste Zeit, dass die europäische Union deutlich macht, dass Freiheitsliebe seit der Antike ein integraler Bestandteil der europäischen Geisteshaltung ist, dass diese Freiheitsliebe eine Voraussetzung für die Schaffung der Gemeinschaft war, dass sie die Bewegkraft hinter der Erhebung gegen das totalitäre Regime in Berlin 1953 war, ebenso wie für das Erwachen Polens 1956, den Aufstand in Budapest 1956 und deren Fortführung in Prag und in Warschau – bis hin zum Fall der Berliner Mauer. Darauf folgte dann die Erhebung der Studierenden in Belgrad gegen Milosevic, die Rosenrevolution in Tbilissi und der orange Dezember in Kiew. Es ist allerhöchste Zeit, klar und deutlich

zu sagen, dass „Das andere Russland“ und Garri Kasparow in viel höherem Maße als einige Divisionen der Seele Europas entsprechen.

André Glucksmann

Danke.

Gertraud Auer

Meine sehr geehrten Damen und Herren, ich danke Ihnen, dass Sie an diesem Abend teilgenommen haben.